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1.  Introduction 
 
This paper explores the implications of bequests for the statistical pattern of 
equilibrium stock and bond returns.  It does so in the context of a “behavioral style” 
model in which households make their consumption and savings decisions not only to 
smooth consumption over their saving and dis-saving years, but also to provide for 
“indirect consumption” in their old age in the form of inter-vivos transfers and bequests.  
In this paper these two terms are used interchangeably, as the generality of our model 
precludes distinguishing between them.
1 We model the elderly as being motivated by a 
well defined “joy of giving”.  
There are two primary motivations for this study: 
1.  Over the next thirty years the “baby-boom” generation will grant to its heirs 
many trillions of dollars of economic property, including a majority of the stock 
market’s total capitalization.  It is thus of interest to explore – in anticipation of the 
aforementioned event – the implications of a model with an explicit bequest motive for 
the profile of security prices and returns. We find that the explicit incorporation of 
bequests – even at a high level of generality – has substantial impact on these profiles, 
frequently in unexpected ways. 
2.  Intuition suggests that bequests may provide a possible route to the resolution 
of some of the most celebrated anomalies in financial economics; viz., the risk free and 
                                                 
1 Our model construct presumes that gifts of either sort can occur only in the final period of an agent’s 
life.  Since in basic discrete time models we may assume consumption occurs at any time within a period,   3 
equity premium puzzles.  The logic with respect to the equity premium and risk free 
rate puzzles is particularly straightforward.  Within the context of the representative 
consumer, time separable preferences paradigm of, e.g., Grossman and Shiller (1981), 
Hansen and Singleton (1983), and Mehra and Prescott (1985), it is the very low 
covariance of aggregate consumption growth with equity returns that constitutes a 
major stumbling block to explaining the mean equity premium; vis-à-vis consumption 
risk, stocks are simply too good a hedging instrument to command a return much in 
excess of that on risk free securities. 
In the  model to be considered here, however, the magnitude of a household’s 
bequests – and the indirect utility thereby derived – are perfectly positively correlated 
with the prices of and returns to securities.
2  With regard to “bequest risk”, equity 
securities, in particular, constitute an especially poor hedge, a fact that suggests high 
equilibrium equity and low risk free returns.  Confirming this basic intuition, our 
benchmark cases indeed display high equity premia in conjunction with low risk free 
returns. It is not the case, however, that an increased preference for bequests necessarily 
results in a higher premium. 
These explorations entail significant methodological innovations in the nature of 
the economy’s fundamental asset pricing relationships. No longer are asset prices 
benchmarked solely to consumption and the standard inter-temporal consumption trade-
                                                                                                                                                            
it may be viewed either as preceding the gift (in which case the gift effectively constitutes a bequest) or in 
simultaneity with it (in which case the gift qualifies as an inter-vivos transfer). 
2 And, of course, real estate.  Our model does not attempt to explicitly model real estate as a differential 
asset.   4 
off. In effect, the consumption cost to an investor of acquiring one more unit of an asset 
is significantly reduced by the amount of the bequest he can rationally expect to receive. 
In a stationary equilibrium, the more investors wish to bequeath, the more wealth they 
receive – in the form of bequests – with which with to do so. Equilibrium asset prices 
are thus higher than they would be otherwise in an identically parameterized standard 
pure consumption-savings context. 
What motivates the bequeathing of economic property?  While a casual 
consideration of bequests naturally assumes that they exist because of parents’ altruistic 
concern for the economic status of their offspring, results in Hurd (1989) and Kopczuk 
and Lupton (2004), among others (see also Wilhelm (1996), Laitner and Juster (1996), 
Altonji et al. (1997), and Laitner and Ohlsson (2001)), suggest otherwise: households 
with children do not in general exhibit behavior more in accord with a bequest motive 
than childless households.  As a result, the literature is presently largely agnostic as to 
bequest motivation, attributing bequests to general idiosyncratic, egoistic reasons.
3  The 
model we will explore, however, is sufficiently general to be consistent both with purely 
egoistic and purely altruistic, concern-for-offspring based motivations.  
Although the motivation for bequests is not yet well understood, there is little 
dispute as to their pervasiveness and significance for household capital accumulation.  
Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) present evidence that roughly 46% of household wealth 
arises from intergenerational transfers, although Modigliani’s (1988) analysis points to a   5 
more modest 20% estimate.
4  Other studies place inherited wealth as a proportion of 
household wealth in the range of 15% – 31%.
5  Using a more general statistical 
methodology, Kopczuk and Lupton (2004) estimate that 70% of the elderly population 
has a bequest motive, which directly motivates 53% of the wealth accumulation in single 
person, elderly U. S. households. Among wealthy households, those that own the vast 
majority of stocks and are most likely to trade financial instruments, Hurd and 
Mundaca (1989) report that between 44% and 60% of household wealth is attributable 
to gifts and inheritances. None of these estimates is so small as to imply that bequests 
can be ignored in a discussion of asset pricing regularities.  Yet, to our knowledge, the 
implications of bequests for such regularities have not yet been explored in the applied 
literature. 
  A consideration of bequests mandates that our study be undertaken in an OLG 
context. Agents live for three periods.  In the first period, while young, they consume 
their income and neither borrow nor lend.  We adopt this convention as a parsimonious 
device for acknowledging that, with a steep expected future income profile, the young do 
not wish to lend and cannot borrow because they have no assets to offer as collateral.  
In the second, high wage, middle-aged period of their lives they consume, save for old 
                                                                                                                                                            
3 These empirical results will lead us to eschew the perspective of Barro and Becker (1988), who postulate 
that each generation receives utility from the consumption of the generations to follow, in favor of a more 
general formulation. 
4 We discuss the basis of this wide discrepancy in estimates in the calibration section of the paper.  The 
estimates themselves come from converting flows of bequests into stocks of capital.  Alternatively, one 
may estimate life cycle savings and compare this with accumulated wealth.  Under this latter method, the 
estimates of Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) and Modigliani (1988) become, respectively, 81% and 20%. 
5 This range of estimates is drawn from Menchick and David, (1983), Modigliani (1988), Hurd and 
Mundaca (1989), Gale and Scholz (1994), and Laitner and Juster (1996).   6 
age and receive bequests of securities from the then old who were born one period 
earlier.  In the third and final period of their lives, as elderly, they consume out of their 
pension income and savings and themselves leave the residual as a bequest of securities, 
the value of which is modeled as directly providing them utility. 
  We further refine the behavior of the elderly in a number of alternative ways.  In 
the simplest version of the model, the consumption of the old is fixed, with the entire 
residual value of savings going to bequests.  For the old aged, the only source of risk is 
therefore bequest risk.  In making this assumption we appeal to the fact that a 
substantial component of old aged spending is medically determined.  It is thus related 
to the state of a person’s health and uncorrelated with the business cycle.  Other 
components of old aged consumption, such as vacations, entertainment and housing, are 
also largely a function of the state of an elderly person’s health.  Particularly for the 
well-to-do, fluctuations in the value of their wealth invested in the stock market play 
but a secondary role in determining overall spending, a fact that is confirmed by the low 
empirical correlation between the direct consumption of the old and the return on the 
stock market.  As a first approximation, it is thus reasonable to exclude the direct 
consumption of the old consumers from consideration in examining the relevant Euler 
equations.  Fixing old age direct consumption has this effect.  Subsequent versions of 
the model jointly endogenize the choice between old-age direct consumption versus 
indirect consumption in the form of bequests.     7 
  While our discussion thus far has stressed the motivation for bequests, there is 
also the issue of who receives them. Many of our results that most accurately replicate 
the data require that a portion of bequests be generation-skipping; that is, granted to 
the young (grandchildren) rather than to the middle aged (children). More generally we 
can thus view our work as investigating the asset pricing implications of various family 
arrangements for bequeathing wealth. We do not consider, however, the consequences of 
alternative estate tax mechanisms.   
1.1 Related Literature 
  The theoretical antecedents of this work are many.  Since not all agents in our 
model hold securities, it is directly related to the literature emphasizing the limited 
participation of some households in the financial markets.  Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) 
emphasize that it should be the risk preferences and consumption risk of the 
stockholding class that matter for equilibrium security returns.  Although 52 percent of 
the U.S. adult population held stock directly or indirectly in 1998, as compared to 36 
percent in 1989, substantial stock holdings remain largely concentrated in the portfolios 
of the wealthiest few.  Brav, Constantinides, and Geczy (2002) and Vissing-Jorgenson 
(2002) find evidence that per capita consumption growth can explain the equity 
premium with a relatively high coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) once we 
account for limited stock market participation.
6  In addition, wealthy investors may be 
                                                 
6 Brav, Constantinides, and Geczy (2002) point out, however, that the statistical evidence is weak and the 
results highly sensitive to experimental design.   8 
infra marginal in the equity markets if their wealth is tied up in private equity.  See, for 
example, Blume and Zeldes (1993) and Haliassos and Bertaut (1995). 
  The presence of financial market incompleteness connects us to another well 
developed branch of the literature.  Bewley (1982), Mankiw (1986) and Mehra and 
Prescott (1985) suggest the potential of enriching the asset pricing implications of the 
representative agent paradigm by relaxing the implicit complete markets paradigm.  
More recently, Constantinides and Duffie (1996) confirm that incomplete markets can 
substantially enrich the implications of the representative household.  Their main result 
is a proposition demonstrating, by construction, the existence of a household income 
process, consistent with calibrated aggregate dividend and income processes such that 
equilibrium equity and bond price processes match the analogous observed price 
processes for the U.S. economy.  Unlike the household-specific heterogeneity introduced 
in Constantinides and Duffie (1996), the OLG model considered here emphasizes only 
the heterogeneity across age cohorts.  Whereas introducing household-specific 
heterogeneity may enhance the explanatory power of the model, we eschew this option 
in order to highlight the role of the indirect consumption of the old aged in the form of 
gifts and bequests.  See Kocherlakota (1996) for an excellent review of the drawbacks to 
relying purely on incomplete-markets phenomena. 
1.2 Outline of the Paper 
  The outline of the paper is as follows:  Section 2 details the simplest model 
formulation and presents the calibration. That agents receive utility directly from the   9 
magnitude of their bequests represents a departure from the standard Arrow-Debreu 
equilibrium construct: the level of consumption provided by the bequests simultaneously 
provides utility to two distinct agents, the old who bequeath the bequests and the 
middle-aged who receive them.  Existence issues are addressed. In Section 3 we present 
the results of computing equilibrium security prices and returns for a wide class of 
reasonable parameterizations.  Robustness issues are explored in Section 4 where we also 
generalize the model to allow the old to undertake a consumption-bequest choice. 
Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2.  The Model, Equilibrium and Calibration 
2.1 Model Description 
  As in Constantinides et al. (2002), we consider an overlapping generations, pure 
exchange economy in which each generation lives for three periods, as young, middle 
aged and old.  Each generation is modeled as a representative consumer, a choice that 
implicitly ignores consumer heterogeneity within a generation in favor of exploring the 
implications of heterogeneity across generations in as parsimonious a construct as 
possible. 
  Income (output) in this model is denominated in terms of a single consumption 
good, and may be received either as wages, dividends or interest payments.  There are 
two types of securities in positive net supply, an equity claim and a consol bond, b.  
Each bond pays one unit of the consumption good every period in perpetuity (aggregate   10 
interest payments are thus b) and  qt
b denotes its period t, ex-coupon price.  We view the 
bond as a proxy for long-term government debt. 
  The single equity security represents a claim to the stochastic aggregate dividend 
stream {dt}.  We interpret the dividend as the sum total of all private capital income 
including corporate dividends, corporate bond interest and net rents.  The ex-dividend 
period t share price is denoted by qt
e. In equilibrium, the stock and consol bond are the 
instruments by which the economic participants can seek to alter their income profiles 
across dates and states. 
  Lastly, we postulate the existence of a one period, risk free discount security, 
with period t price  qt
rf in zero net supply.  The payoff profile associated with such a 






While the formal presence or absence of this security does not alter the equilibrium 
allocations in any way, we include it in order to assess the economy’s implied risk free 
rate.  In what follows, we detail only the most basic version of the model; elaborations 
are detailed in subsequent sections.   
Let 
 
Bt 2,2 be the total bequest in period t granted by the old generation born 
two periods previously. We hypothesize that they grant the fraction x to their 
grandchildren, those born in the current period t, and the fraction (1-x) to their children   11 
born in t-1. Under this arrangement each generation receives two bequests over the 
course of its life, one from its parents and another from its grandparents. 




0 and a bequest of securities 
 
xBt 2,2when young. We assume that he 
concludes the young period of his life with zero holdings of securities; in effect, 
 
ct,0 = c0 = W
0 + xBt 2,2, where 
 
c0,t denotes the consumption of a young agent born in 
period t.  This requirement is a simple way of capturing the fact that wage income does 
not collateralize loans in modern economies, and that under our calibration, the wage 
cum wealth profile of a representative consumer is sufficiently steep that it is non-
optimal for him to save. 
  In the second period of his life, as middle aged, the period-t-born agent receives a 
stochastic wage income,    
  Wt+1
1 , and a stochastic bequest of securities from the preceding 
generation born in period t-1; we denote the latter by
   
(1  x)  Bt 1,2 .  Out of this aggregate 
wealth, the middle aged agent chooses the number of equity securities, 
 
zt,1




b , and risk free securities, 
 
zt,1
rf he wishes to acquire in order to finance his old-
age consumption and bequests, and his (residual) level of middle aged consumption.  





e +  qt+1
b b




rf  ≤    
  Wt+1
1  + 
   
(1  x)  Bt 1,2  
where ct,1 denotes the consumption of a middle aged agent born in period t.   12 
  In the final period of his life, the period-t born-agent receives a pension 
income W
2. He fully consumes this quantity. He also consumes, by selling securities from 
his portfolio, and bequeaths his residual holdings: 
(2) 
   
  Bt,2= 
 
zt,1
e  (   
  qt+2 +   dt+2) + 
 
zt,1
b  (   
  qt+2








In effect, the elderly in this model sell a portion of their security holdings to the middle 
aged to supplement their old-age pension income. Their total consumption is 
therefore
   
W
2 +   c
*
t,2 , and they pass down the residual value of their portfolio as a gift. We 
consider the case when    
  c2 is endogenously determined and when it is fixed: 
   
  c
*
t,2 = c2. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the later is a parsimonious device to capture the fact at 
old age consumption is uncorrelated with the return on securities and is largely 
governed by health status.   13 
 
  Taking prices as given, the decision problem faced by a representative agent 





















   
 
  s.t. 
   
ct,o   W
0 + x  Bt 2,2 
    ct,1 + 







rf     Wt
1 + (1  x)  Bt 1,2 
   
   
  c
*
t,2 +   Bt,2   (  qt+2
e +   dt+2) zt,1
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zt,1
e  1, 0 ≤
 
zt,1




In the above formulation, u (·) denotes the agent’s utility-of-consumption function and v 
(·) his utility-of-bequests function.  The constant M is the relative weight assigned to 
the utility of bequests. Both u (·) and v(·) are assumed to display all the basic 
properties sufficient for problem (3) to be well defined: they are continuously 
differentiable, strictly concave, increasing, and satisfy the Inada conditions.  The 
postulated bequest function v(·) is sufficiently general to encompass both altruistic and 
egoistic bequest motivations. Notice that old agents are concerned only about their 
aggregate bequest and not its relative apportionment to their children and their 
grandchildren.   14 
 
 
2.2 Optimality Conditions and Equilibrium 
  Let    
  Yt  denote the period t aggregate income.  By construction, the economy’s 
overall budget constraint satisfies:  
(4)     
  Yt =    W
0 +   Wt
1 + W
2  + b +
   
  dt = c0 +   ct 1, 1 +   ct 2,2 . 
We first examine the case where old age consumption is fixed, that is 
   
  c
*
2,t = c2 so 
that
   
  c2,t = c2 + W
2. In equilibrium, the middle aged are the exclusive source of the 
demand for securities, and their optimal holdings are determined by the tradeoff 
between their marginal utility of consumption as middle aged and the expected 
discounted marginal benefit to granting one additional unit of indirect consumption in 
the form of a bequest.  Taking prices as given, the middle aged agent’s optimal holdings 
of equity, bonds, and risk free assets satisfy, respectively, the following three equations:  
(5) 
   
zt,1
e :u1(ct,1)qt
e =  Et Mv1(  Bt,2)[qt+1
e + dt+1] { } 
(6) 
   
zt,1
b :u1(ct,1)qt
b =  Et Mv1(  Bt,2)[qt+1
b +1] { } 
(7) 
   
zt,1
rf :u1(ct,1)qt
rf =  Et Mv1(  Bt,2) { } 
where (i) 
   
  Bt,2is defined as in (2) and, (ii), the (conditional) expectations are taken over 
all realizations of the economy’s aggregate state variables,    
  Yt+1and   
  Wt+1
1 .   




e = 1, 
 
zt,1
b = b, and zt,1
rf = 0. 
Imposing these market clearing conditions on the first order conditions (5)-(7) and 
recognizing that all the constraints in problem (3) will be satisfied with equality, we 
define a Stationary Bequest Equilibrium as follows: 
 
Definition:  A Stationary Equilibrium for the economy described by problem (3) and 





1) and  q
rf (Yt, Wt
1) which satisfy equations (9) – (11): 
(9)  u1( Wt







    = β
 
Mv1   (q
e(Yt+1, Wt+1
1 ) + d(Yt+1, Wt+1
1 ) + bq
b(Yt+1, Wt+1
1 ) + b - c2) 
      [q
e(Yt+1, Wt+1
1 ) + d(Yt+1, Wt+1)] dF(Yt+1, Wt+1
1 ;Yt, Wt
1) 
(10)  u1( Wt







    = β
 
Mv1   (q
e(Yt+1, Wt+1
1 ) + d(Yt+1, Wt+1
1 ) + bq
b(Yt+1, Wt+1
1 ) + b - c2) 
      [q
b(Yt+1, Wt+1
1 ) + 1] dF(Yt+1, Wt+1
1 ; Yt, Wt
1),  
and 
(11)  u1( Wt







    = β
 
Mv1   (q
e(Yt+1, Wt+1
1 ) + d(Yt+1, Wt+1
1 ) + bq
b(Yt+1, Wt+1
1 ) + b - c2)] 
      dF(Yt+1, Wt+1
1 ; Yt,  Wt
1),   16 
where dF(;) denotes the conditional density function on the economy’s aggregate state 
variables. 
  Specializing the economy even further, we assume that the joint stochastic 
evolution of (   
  Yt ,   
  Wt
1) is governed by a discrete Markov process with no absorbing 
states.  Our benchmark calibration recognizes that output and the total wage bill are 
highly positively correlated in the U.S. economy. A number of variations are considered 
which differ only with respect to the assumed correlation structure between   
  Yt  and   
  Wt
1.   
  As was argued in the introduction, asset prices are higher in the presence of 
bequests than in a standard consumption-savings setting and the basis for this assertion 
is directly apparent in equations (9) – (11):  there is a reduced (by the factor (1-x)) 
middle aged utility cost of paying more for a security since higher prices only mean 
greater offsetting bequests in our stationary equilibrium (see also Geanakoplos et al. 
(2003))
7.  As a result, prices are bid up to higher levels.  
To varying degrees, all three agents receive utility from the same portfolio of securities: 
the young, whose consumption is enhanced when they sell their share of the bequest to 
the middle-aged; the middle aged who receive the bulk of the inheritance which thereby 
allows them to save for their own bequests with a much diminished reduction in 
                                                 









not appear in the marginal utility expressions on the left hand side of, respectively, equations (9), (10), 
and (11). This is unlike in a standard OLG setting. As the “auctioneer” calls out an increasing set of 
prices, the marginal utility of period t consumption does not increase to reduce demand.  The effect of 
price increases on the suppression of demand is thus greatly reduced, a fact that suggests the possibility of 
explosive price behavior.  That prices are likely to be higher under a bequest equilibrium relative to a   17 
consumption; and the old who receive utility directly from the bequests they bequeath. 
As such, equations (9) – (11) represent a fundamental departure from the standard 
CCAPM based asset pricing relationships and are unique to the ‘behavioral finance’ 
literature. 
  Following Constantinides et al. (2002), we specify four admissible states 
representing two possible values of output in conjunction with two possible values of the 
wage endowment of the middle aged.  The two preference functions are assumed to be 




1   C
, i = 0, 1, 2, and 
 




1    B
.  In 
general we impose γc = γB for the benchmark cases, though subsequently we explore 
  C     B  (  C >   Bis intuitively the more plausible case).  With these specifications, the 
equations defining the equilibrium functions may be simplified as follows: 














e(k)+ d(k))  jk
(q
e(k)+ d(k)+ bq
b(k)+ b  c2)
 B k=1
4
   

















b(k)+ b  c2)
 B k=1
4
   
                                                                                                                                                            
pure consumption savings context says nothing about relative return behavior, however.  An explicit 
solution for equations (9) - (11) is therefore required.   18 
















b(k)+ b  c2)
 B k=1
4
   
where the states are indexed j = 1,2,3,4 and d(j) = Y(j) – W
1(j) – W
0 – b, and πjk 
represents the probability of passing from state j to k.   
 
2.3 Existence of Equilibrium and its Properties 
  Generically (that is, for all reasonable parameterizations of Y(j), W
1(j), W
0, d(j), 
 c2, β, and πij) equilibrium does not exist for this bequest driven model.  In particular, if 
M is “too small,” securities are insufficiently valued for bequests to be strictly positive 
in all states.  As a consequence, there is no solution to (9￿)  – (11￿)  with positive real 
prices.  If M is extremely large, middle aged investors, in their desire to leave more 
generous bequests, bid up security prices all the while receiving simultaneously more 
resources with which to do so.  This scenario  gives rise to equilibria where prices are so 
high that returns are absurdly low (even extremely negative in the risk free asset case).  
These latter equilibria are of little interest.  Taken together these considerations suggest 
a fairly narrow range of M values 0 < M1 < M < M2  < ∞ for which relevant equilibria 
are likely to result
8. These thoughts are confirmed in the numerical solutions to follow. 
See appendix 1 for proof of existence. 
                                                 
8 For the parameterization considered here the interval 
￿ 




, 1 [ ].   19 
  By the homogeneity property of our utility specification, the numerical search for 
the equilibrium price functions can be substantially simplified: if {(q
e(j), q
b(j), q
rf (j))  j = 
1,2,3,4} constitutes an equilibrium for an economy defined by {(Y(j), W
1(j), W0, b, c2):  
j = 1,2,3,4}, then for any λ>0, {(λq
e(j), q
b(j), q
rf (j)):  j=1,2,3,4} is an equilibrium for 
the economy defined by {(λY(j), λW
1(j), λW0, λb, λ c2):  j=1,2,3,4}.
9 Returns are thus 
unaffected if the economy is scaled up or down. 
 
2.4 The Comparison Pareto Optimum 
  One can approach the notion of a Pareto optimum for a bequest driven model 
from a number of perspectives.  On the one hand, with utility defined over wealth 
(prices) the standard notion of a Pareto optimal allocation as one resulting from the 
actions of an all powerful central planner empowered to reallocate real resources does 
not apply.  We therefore must appeal to the notion of a constrained Pareto optimum, 
constrained by the participation of the market (trading) mechanism. That is, either 
before or after the planner reallocates “something,” trade must be permitted. 
  There does not seem to be, a priori, an obviously unique way to do this. For 
example, one could postulate the “planner” as choosing the value of x such that the 
expected welfare of a representative cohort is maximized. Alternatively, one could 
propose a Pareto optimum allocation as that arising from the application of a system of 
                                                 
9 If γC ≠ γB, then the economy with scaled output, wages, interest payments and old aged consumption 
will have the same prices as the unscaled economy but with M altered to
C B M
       , where λ is the scaling 
factor.   20 
wage taxes and wage subsidies such that, again, the welfare of a representative cohort is 
maximized. Since we are principally interested in security price and return behavior, 
however, we maintain our emphasis on the bequest equilibrium economy alone.
10 
 
3.  Calibration 
  In this section we select parameter values for the period utility and bequest 
function while also specifying the joint stochastic process on Yt and Wt
1.  Our calibration 
closely follows Constantinides et al. (2002). 
  There are eleven parameter values to be selected: {(Y(j), W
1(j):  j=1,2,3,4}, W
0, 
b,  c2, β,   M, γC and γB}.  In light of the homogeneity property, for an arbitrary choice 
of E(Y), {Y(j), W
1(j): j=1,2,3,4}, W
0, b, and  c2can be chosen to replicate the 
fundamental ratios 
   
    Y E(   Y),     W1 E(   W
1), E(W
0) / E(   Y) , E(W
0 +   W
1 + W
2) / E(   Y) , E(b) / E(   Y) and E(c2) / E(   Y)
 
 With a period corresponding to 20 years, and a maximum of five or six reliable non-
overlapping 20 year periods in U.S. real GDP and aggregate wage data, it is difficult to 
conclusively fix the output and middle aged wage coefficients of variation.  Following 
the discussion in our earlier paper, both are chosen to be about 0.20
11 (see 
Constantinides et al. (2002) for an elaboration). 
                                                 
10 Our benchmark calibrations will call for x = .25. By evaluating the expected utility of a representative cohort for a 
variety of x, we find that x = .25 is not far from the Pareto optimum. 
11 The exact values are 0.18 for the former and 0.23 for the latter.   21 
  The remaining ratios, however, can be established with more confidence.  
Consistent with U.S. historical experience, we fix the share of income to interest on U.S. 
government debt,    b / E(   Y), at 0.03.  Depending on the historical period and the manner 
by which single proprietorship income is imputed, the average share of income to wages, 
   E(W
0 +   W
1 + W
2) / E(   Y)is generally estimated (U.S. data) to lie in the range (.60, .75).  
For most of our examples, we match the ratio    E(W
0 +   W
1 + W
2) / E(   Y) = 0.69 
  We choose  W
0,W
2 and  c2in order to replicate the U.S. age-consumption 
expenditure profile in Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2002; Figure 4.1.1), where we 
interpret our three period lifetimes as corresponding roughly to the 0-20, 20-60 and 60-
80 age cohorts detailed there.  For our benchmark calibration, in particular, their data 
suggest
   
W
2 + c2
E(   Y)
  0.2 and
   
W
0
E(   Y)
  0.2
12 . We satisfy these conditions by 
choosing W
0 =18,000, W
2 = 8,000  and c2 =10,000 . Lastly, we fix β =.55 (corresponding 
to a β
annual = .97) for all cases and, in all benchmark calibrations, γC = γB=5, which is 
within the acceptable range of estimates provided by micro studies.  
  None of the aforementioned expectations and standard deviations can be 
computed without specifying the Markov chain governing the evolution of the    
  Yt and  
state variables.  Following Constantinides et al. (2002) we postulate a transition matrix 
Π of the form: 
 
                                                 
12 Fernanadez-Villaverde and Krueger (2002) present data on per capita consumption on a quarterly basis 
from year 20 to year 80.  Aggregating these quantities into the 20-60 and 60-80 age ranges plus adopting   22 
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1 ).   
  Taking all these requirements into account yields the following benchmark 
calibration:  Yt  {126, 200, 86,850},  Wt
1  {57, 850, 26, 450}, c2 =10,000, W
0 =18,000 and 
￿ 
W2 =8000 with these quantities employed in conjunction with any of the four 




      Correlation Structures and Associated Parameter Values 
 
 


















   
0.1  0.1  .5298  .0202  .0247  .4253  .01 
0.8  0.1  .8393  .0607  .0742  .0258  .03 
0.1  0.8  .5496  .0004  .0034  .4466  .03 
0.8  0.8  .8996  .0004  .0034  .0966  .03 
 
  It remains to calibrate the parameter M. 
                                                                                                                                                            
the convention that quarterly consumption in years 1-20 coincides with year 20 first quarter consumption 
yields the indicated proportions.   23 
 
3.1  Choosing a Value for the Bequest Parameter M 
  The parameter M, by governing the extent to which the middle-aged desire to 
bequeath, substantially influences both the relative and absolute level of equilibrium 
security price. Given this setting we select a value for M in order that the share of 
existing wealth that is being gifted, 
 
Bt 1, 2 qt
e + dt + b(qt
b +1) ( ) ( ), roughly respects the 
data. 
  As noted in the introduction, Summers and Kotlikoff (1981) estimate that 
intergenerational transfers (inter-vivos gifts and bequests), as a fraction of private 
wealth accumulation can be as much as 80%, while Modigliani (1988) concludes that a 
reasonable lower bound on this same fraction is 20%.  These estimates differ because of 
the inconsistent treatment of durable goods valuation, college tuition payments and the 
assumed fraction of inheritances not spent.  The average of these extreme estimates 
suggests that intergenerational transfers may account for as much as 50% of private 
wealth accumulation, a figure consistent with estimates in Hurd and Mundaca (1989) 
for high income families.  In terms of absolute quantities, Gale and Scholz (1992) 
estimate (for the year 1983) that the flow of bequests was on the order of $30 – $40 
billion, with inter-vivos transfers ranging to $56 billion.  If college tuition expenses are 
included, the latter rises to $88 billion.  Unfortunately, none of these studies separates 
out bequests and gifts of marketable securities from aggregate totals (which include real 
estate, undoubtedly the largest component of smaller estates).    24 
  A more useful estimate of the desired ratio can be obtained directly from estate 
tax data which provides the aggregate market value of bequeathed equity.  As a fraction 
of CRSP aggregate Equity Market Value, this latter quantity gives a rough 
approximation to the 
 
Bt 1, 2 qt
e + dt + b(qt
b +1) ( ) ( )ratio under a number of simplifying 
assumptions.  Since equity bequests include private equity we need to argue that the 
latter is small. McGrattan and Prescott (2000), for the year 2000 estimate that more 
than 90% of business capital is publicly traded equity capital, an estimate that supports 
this assertion.  Consistent with the figures in the prior paragraph we will also assume 
that inter-vivos transfers of stock alone may be conservatively estimated as having value 
equal to stock transfers as elements of bequests.
13 
  Under these assumptions, the ratio of twice the value of equity bequests as a 
proportion of CRSP aggregate market value is roughly analogous to our 
quantity
 
Bt 1, 2 qt
e + dt + b(qt
b +1) ( ) ( ).  Table 2 below supplies the relevant data for a 
selection of the years for which data is available. 
                                                 
13 Most equity is owned by the wealthiest segment of the population who holds an above average fraction 
of their total wealth in stock.  We are simply asserting here that for this segment of the population, the 
fraction {(inter vivos transfers of equity/value of bequested equity} is approximately the same as the 
ratio of {inter vivos transfers/ bequests} for the population as a whole.   25 
Table 2 




















1931  1.909    21.577      .0885 
1938  1.273    40.680      .0313 
1950  1.773    85.701      .0207 
1961  6.766    383.720      .0180 
1970  10.495    643.326      .0163 
1977  12.483    1002.450      .0124 
1991  27.087    4072.320      .0067 
1996  44.151    8497.241      .0052 
2001  77.343    14,419.260      .0055 
(i) all values measured in billions of dollars 
(ii) Source:  IRS Estate Tax Returns, Publication 764; indicated years. 
 
  The value of annually bequeathed stock generally declined as a percentage of 
aggregate stock market value until the 1990s when it stabilized at roughly 0.6%.  On 
the basis of a 20 year time horizon, and assuming stationary-in-levels asset values, this 
represents a total equity bequest equal to 12% of aggregate stock market valuations. If 
1977 is used as the base, the ratio rises to 25%; in 1950 the fraction was around 45% 
while in 1931 it was 160%. These figures suggest a wide of estimates
14. Doubling these 
figures to include inter-vivos transfers, in any event, encourages us to conclude that a 
reasonable value of M should result in a ratio 
 
Bt 1, 2 qt
e + dt + b(qt
b +1) ( ) ( ) lying in the 
range [0.5, 1] for postwar data. This is easily attained given our parameterization.    26 
  In what follows we numerically solve equations (9) – (11) for the indicated 
parameterizations.  In order to gauge model sensitivity, we allow M, and   C=   B to 
vary.  Since the results depend very little, either qualitatively or quantitatively, on the 
choice of transition matrix, we typically only report results for cases corresponding to 
   = .5298. 
4  Equilibrium Results 
 
4.1  Benchmark Economy 
Much of the intuition provided by this model is evident from the fixed old age 
consumption case.  This perspective was justified earlier by arguing that the 
consumption of the old aged is governed by their health status, a circumstance that is 
likely to be unrelated to the business cycle, especially for those with large equity 
holdings.  Fixing old-age consumption at a constant level reflects this viewpoint in a 
parsimonious way. 
  Table 3 provides a basic set of results for an uncontroversial set of parameters.  
The risk aversion parameter γC is fixed at γC = 5, and M is chosen to be M =
 
1
10 .  It 
seems intuitively reasonable that agents would value their bequests less highly than 
their own consumption. 
                                                                                                                                                            
14 The substantially lower figures for more recent years are interesting and may reflect either an increased 
use of tax avoidance schemes (e.g., generation-skipping trusts) by the very wealthy who own the lion’s 
share of equity in the U.S. or the broader ownership of stocks in small estates exempt from taxation.   27 
Table 3 
Basic Financial Statistics: First Benchmark Parameterization 










10 ,  
φ=.5298 
γC =γB =5, x=0.25 
     (a)
(ii)  (b)    (a)  (b) 
return on equity  7.0  16.5    6.1  17.1 
risk free return  .80  5.7    1.2  21.9 
equity premium  6.2  16.7    5.0  11.7 
    Range      Range 
bequests/assets
(iii)    0.5 to 1      0.69  to 0.93 
           
(i)  For this set of parameters, the corresponding middle aged consumption and bequests in 
states j=1,2,3,4 are: c1(1) = 68,084; c1(2) = 45,182; c1(3) = 56,155; c1(4) = 43,006; B(1) = 
88,465; B(2) = 22,672; B(3) = 136,181; B(4) = 31,375. 
(ii)  (a) is the unconditional mean while (b) is the unconditional standard deviation annualized 
in the manner described in Footnote (10).  All returns are real.  U.S. data from Mehra and 
Prescott (1985). 
(iii)  This ratio is defined as
 
q
e(j) + d(j) + b(q
b(j) +1)   c
2
q
e(j) + d(j) + b(q
b(j) +1)
 with the range defined in reference to 
this quantity across the four states. 
   
The benchmark economy displays considerable success in replicating the mean 
return on equity (6.1) and its standard deviation (17.1).
15  The equity premium is a 
robust  5.0%,  attributable  in  large  measure to  a  relatively  low  risk  free  rate  (1.2%).  
Also, the bequests/assets ratio falls comfortably within the range of empirical estimates. 
                                                 
15 The reader is cautioned to keep in mind how these returns are computed and the consequent 




j 1 k 1
1 q (k) d(k)
log
20 q (j) = =
+
                  
           with the mean returns of the other securities computed 
analogously.  In the above expression 
j    denotes the stationary probability of state j.  The 20 year 
standard deviation of the equity return was computed as 
1/ 2 2 e e 4 4 4 4
j jk j jk e e
j 1 k 1 j 1 k 1
q (k) d(k) q (k) d(k)
log log
q (j) q (j) = = = =
+ +
     
                                     
                  







= .  Again, the return standard deviations for the other securities were 
computed in an identical fashion.   28 
The standard deviation of the risk free return, however, is too high (21.9) and 
exceeds the standard deviation of the equity return.  To understand this, consider the 
special case  x = c2 = b = 0 while appealing to continuity arguments for wider 
applicability.  The Euler equations of consumption for the prices of equity and the one-




e(j) =  M W
1(j)+ d(j) ( )
 C  jk
q










rf (j) =  M W
1(j)+ d(j) ( )
 C  jk
q
e(k)+ d(k) ( )
 B k=1
4
  .        (4.2) 
 
The Euler equation of equity is isomorphic to that of the one-period bond except that 
the degree of bequest risk aversion is lower by one.  This follows directly from the fact 
that the equity’s next period pre-dividend value partially offsets variation in its 
marginal utility of wealth (for log utility the offset is perfect), making it effectively the 
less risky security in utility-of-bequest terms. 
In the context of the consumption-based asset pricing model, higher risk aversion 
typically leads to higher return volatility because consumers have a greater incentive to 
smooth consumption.  Their demand for securities is thus higher in high-income states 
and lower in low-income ones.  Ceteris paribus, security price volatility and return 
volatility are higher.  Similar reasoning applies to our bequest economy.  Equity is 
effectively priced in a less risk averse environment and consequently displays lower 
return volatility, as observed. 
Our results suggest that if a particular security (under our parameterizations, 
equity) provides the overwhelming majority of bequest utility, that security will display 
the greater relative price stability irrespective of the volatility of its dividend.  In a   29 
world where agents derive utility directly from bequests (wealth), the notion of risk is 
blurred.
16  High variability of the risk free rate is sometimes a problem in certain multi-
sector  real  business  cycle  models,  as  in  Boldrin,  Christiano  and  Fisher  (2001).  
Alternative specifications that may reduce the variability of the risk free rate include 
state-dependent risk aversion, as in Campbell and Cochrane (1999). 
Each period two cohorts receive utility from the same portfolio of bequeathed 
securities: the middle aged through an increase in their wealth and the old through the 
joy of giving.  This feature represents a departure from the standard Arrow-Debreu 
economy.  The prices of both equity and bonds are higher in the presence of bequests 
because two cohorts receive utility from the same portfolio of bequeathed securities.
17  In 
the benchmark case, the average equity price is more than twice what is observed in the 
pure consumption-savings analogue for an otherwise identical parameterization.
18 
4.2  Sensitivity to the Bequest Weight 
Table 4 illustrates the effect of increasing the bequest weight M.  As bequests become 
more  important,  security  prices  are  bid up.
19  Since  security  payments  are  unaltered, 
rates of return decrease 
                                                 
16 Cass and Pavlova (2000) illustrate analogous ambiguity in a standard Lucas (1978) asset pricing model 
with log utility where the representative agent trades a risk free bond and a stock. They introduce a 
simple linear transformation by which the stock becomes the risk free asset and the bond becomes the 
risky one in the sense that its payment is now uncertain. While their model context is very different from 
the one considered here, they present a similar instance of the more variable return security having the 
lesser associated payment variation. 
17 See also Gaenakoplos et al. (2003). 





rf do not appear in 
the marginal utility of the middle-aged.  This is unlike in a standard OLG setting.  As the “auctioneer” 
calls out an increasing set of prices, the marginal utility of period t consumption does not increase to 
reduce demand.  The effect of price increases on the suppression of demand is thus greatly reduced, a fact 
that suggests the possibility of explosive price behavior. 




 Effects of Changes in M on Equilibrium Security Prices, Bequests and Returns 
M  0.1  0.5  1 
 
q
e 1 ( )  42,754  64,246  73,343 
 
q
e 2 ( )  3,111  6,684  8,796 
 
q
e 3 ( )  7,927  15,820  20,162 
 
q
e 4 ( )  5,325  10,523  13,357 
 
q
rf 1 ( )  1.40  1.70  1.78 
 
q
rf 2 ( )  0.91  0.92  0.93 
 
q
rf 3 ( )  2.21  2.10  2.05 
 
q
rf 4 ( )  0.17  0.28  0.33 
 
B 1 ( )  88,465  112,010  122,062 
 
B 2 ( )  22,672  29,955  33,651 
 
B 3 ( )  136,181  148,203  153,997 
 
B 4 ( )  31,375  37,430  40,719 
 r
e  6.1 %  4.5%  4.0% 
 
 re   17.1%  14.9%  14.0% 
 r
f   1.2%  0.28%  0.03% 
 
 rf   21.9%  18.0%  16.7% 
 r
p  5.0%  4.2%  3.9% 
 
 rp   11.7%  8.2%  7.1% 
Range B/A  0.69 - 0.93  0.75 - 0.94  0.77 - 0.94 
 
We note that the standard deviations of  the returns to all securities also decline with 
an increase in M and the origin of this result is less obvious and merits discussion. As M 
rises, investors become increasingly concerned about bequest volatility.  Their only 
recourse is to attempt to acquire more securities, thereby bidding up prices but in a 
state by state fashion so as to to diminish price and wealth variation (rational   31 
expectations). As noted, security returns uniformly decline towards zero.  Adding to this 





   
 
   
 
declines dramatically for all j, k state pairs.  In the case of x = 0, c(j) is 
unaffected by M and thus only the denominator,  B(k) , increases.  The net effect is a 
decline in volatility. Note also that as M increases, the equity premium declines from 
the high benchmark level of 5%. This phenomena is directly attributable to the 
enormous increase in security prices which place the investor on a less concave portion 
of his bequest utility function. In effect, as he becomes wealthier the agent becomes less 
bequest risk averse, a result that acts as a break on the ability of bequest parameter M 
to generate arbitrarily high equity premia. It is thus not at all the case that the 
introduction of a bequest motive allows for a facile and contrived resolution of the 
equity premium or risk free rate puzzles. 
 
4.3  Sensitivity to the RRA Coefficient on Consumption and Bequests 
In  Table  5,  we  consider  the  effect  of  an  increase  in  the  RRA  coefficient  of  both 




 Effects of Changes in RRA on Security Prices, Returns and Bequests 
RRA  1  3  5 
 
q
e 1 ( )  5,297  18,642  42,754 
 
q
e 2 ( )  3,691  2,846  3,111 
 
q
e 3 ( )  5,012  5,972  7,927 
 
q
e 4 ( )  2,911  3,980  5,325 
 
q
rf 1 ( )  0.17  0.61  1.40 
 
q
rf 2 ( )  0.65  0.87  0.91 
 
q
rf 3 ( )  0.77  1.73  2.21 
 
q
rf 4 ( )  0.10  0.14  0.17 
 r
e  9.4%  7.4%  6.1 % 
 
 re   10.6%  13.0%  17.1% 
 r
f   6.4%  3.0%  1.1% 
 
 rf   19.4%  21.1%  21.9% 
 r
p  3.0%  4.5%  5.0% 
 
 rp   9.4%  13.2%  11.7% 
Range B/A  0.19 - 0.88  0.60-0.92  0.69-0.93 
 
We see that equity and bond prices increase in all states as γ increases for reasons 
similar to an increase in M.  The average equity/output ratio naturally increases and 
the average bequest-over-assets ratio asymptotically approaches one.  Equity returns 
decrease less rapidly than risk free returns, giving rise to an increasing premium as γ 
increases.  The volatility of returns increases as well. Collectively, these phenomena are 
consistent with behavior of standard CCAPM models (e.g., Mehra and Prescott (1985)).   33 
 
 
4.4  Sensitivity to Changes in the Allocation of Bequests, x 
In Table 6, we present the effect of changing the allocation of bequests between the 
young and the middle aged. 
Table 6 
 Effect of Changes in x on Security Prices, Returns and Bequests 
x  0  .10  .25  .50 
 
q
e 1 ( )  111,162  66,126  42,754  25,829 
 
q
e 2 ( )  3,745  3,456  3,111  2,701 
 
q
e 3 ( )  56,371  17,238  7,927  3,132 
 
q
e 4 ( )  7,878  6,772  5,325  3,384 
 
q
rf 1 ( )  3.39  2.08  1.40  0.90 
 
q
rf 2 ( )  0.91  0.91  0.91  0.90 
 
q
rf 3 ( )  13.18  4.35  2.21  0.99 
 
q
rf 4 ( )  0.24  0.21  0.17  0.12 
 r
e  3.5%  4.9 %  6.1 %  8.0% 
 
 re   27.7%  20.5%  17.1%  16.25% 
 r
f   -2.5%  -0.4%  1.1%  3.2% 
 
 rf   33.3%  25.4%   21.9%  20.5% 
 r
p  6.1%  5.3%  5.0%  4.8% 
 
 rp   10.6%  10.7%  11.7%  12.8% 
 
The  general  effect  of  changes in  the  allocation  of  bequests  is  unambiguous.   As  the 
fraction of bequests passed to the young increases, all security prices decline and returns 
rise and the premium declines.  As x increases, more securities pass to the young, which 
they sell.  The middle aged receive smaller bequests and must, in equilibrium, buy more 
securities.  In effect, the supply of securities (vis-à-vis the middle aged) increases and, 
ceteris paribus, equilibrium prices decline.  This is reinforced by the fact that the wealth   34 
of the middle aged also declines, thereby diminishing demand across the board.  Faced 
with declining resources it is also unsurprising that the middle aged investors should 
slightly shift their portfolio holdings in favor of high payoff securities, the stocks, a fact 
accounts for the diminished premium. 
The other unambiguous phenomena is the greater equity and risk free return volatility,  
as x  
diminishes. This reflects more pronounced wealth effects for the middle-aged investors: 
as x declines there is a progressively diminished consumption cost to the middle aged of 
assembling their own bequest portfolios. As a result, their demand for securities tends to 
react more dramatically to changes in their wealth with the ensuing heightened price 
and return volatility. 
 
4.5  Endogenous Consumption of the Old 
Unlike the benchmark case in which the consumption of the old is fixed, we now 
endogenize the consumption of the old in economies with and without bequests. 
Bequests and old age consumption are thus jointly determined by the added 
requirement that  
 
￿ 
u1 c2 j ( ) ( )  =Mv1 B j ( ) ( ) 
for all states j.  Once B(j) is determined in this way, the fraction x is bequeathed to the 
young and the fraction (1-x) to the middle aged, as before. 
 The results are presented in Table 7.   35 
 
Table 7   Exogenous vs. Endogenous Consumption of the Old 
Consumption 
of the Old 
Exogenous 
with x =0.25 
Endogenous 




c1 1 ( ), 
 
c2 1 ( )  68084, 18000  41755, 57392  43,456, 64,763 
 
c1 2 ( ), 
 
c2 2 ( )  45182, 18000  35716, 28620  37,155, 31,694 
 
c1 3 ( ), 
 
c2 3 ( )  56155, 18000  33851, 64219  24,367, 83,833 
 
c1 4 ( ), 
 
c2 4 ( )  43006,18000  30786, 32878  25325, 43,525 
B(1)  88,465  36,212  0 
B(2)  22,672  18,058  0 
B(3)  136,181  40,519  0 
B(4)  31,375  20,745  0 
 
q
e 1 ( )  42,754  37,442  13,057 
 
q
e 2 ( )  3,111  14,384  15,444 
 
q
e 3 ( )  7,927  9,571  1,561 
 
q
e 4 ( )  5,325  9,706  1,019 
 
q
rf 1 ( )  1.40  0.91  0.44 
 
q
rf 2 ( )  0.91  0.90  1.75 
 
q
rf 3 ( )  2.21  0.57  0.17 
 
q
rf 4 ( )  0.17  0.24  0.04 
 r
e  6.1 %  5.4%  12.1% 
 
 re   17.1%  11.4%  29.6% 
 r
f   1.1%  2.9%  10.1% 
 
 rf   21.9%  12.5%  28.5% 
 r
p  5.0%  2.5%  1.9% 
 
 rp   11.7%  5.3%  10.7% 
Range B/A  0.69-0.93  0.42-0.47  NA 
 
In the first column, we present the benchmark case with exogenous consumption 
for purposes of comparison.  In the second column, the consumption and bequests of the 
old  are  endogenously  determined.    In  the  last  column,  there  are  no  bequests;  the 
consumption of the old is endogenously determined by pure consumption and savings   36 
considerations.
20 Note that for each security type, the associated payments are invariant 
across the three cases. 
As we move across the table from left to right bequests progressively recede in 
importance. Asset prices decline dramatically when bequests are eliminated entirely, a 
fact directly attributable to the large influence bequests have on the equilibrium steady 
state security prices: unlike saving for old age consumption which entails an actual 
(steady state) cost for the middle aged, bequests do not impinge upon middle aged 
consumption (at least to the extent of the (1-x) fraction they receive).  As a further 
consequence of declining bequests, old age consumption increases, but not by the full 
magnitude of the bequest reduction because asset prices are lower. 
A number of other idiosyncratic features of Table 7 are worth exploring.  For 
one,  the  equity  price  is  consistently  highest  in  state  one.    It  is  this  state  that 
corresponds to the highest output level and the highest possible middle-aged wage level.  
While not the highest attained value, dividends in this state are much higher than in a 
majority of the other states.  With a relatively persistent dividend steam and a high 
level of income (wages) with which to purchase securities, it is not surprising that these 
two effects conspire to bid equity prices up to uniquely high levels.  Although state 
                                                 
20  This  corresponds  to  the  constrained  problem  detailed  in  Constantinides  et  al.  (2002):  middle  aged 
agents accumulate securities purely to finance their retirement consumption (no bequests).  The latter is 
accomplished by selling their security accumulation ex dividend to the then middle aged agents.  More 
formally, the maximization problem of the period-t-born agent is: 
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three  experiences  the  highest  dividend,  resources  for  purchasing  securities  are  much 
lower. 
Comparing the endogenous bequest and no bequest cases, it is also interesting to 
observe that middle aged consumption is higher in the former and old age consumption 
higher in the latter.  This is not surprising as bequests provide more resources to the 
middle  aged.    Furthermore,  consumption  appears  to  be  less  smooth  intertemporally 
under the no bequest regime: comparing the endogenous and no bequest cases, in every 
state, middle-aged consumption is lower and old-age consumption higher in the latter 
case.  This phenomenon follows again from the observation that the effect of bequests is 
to shift consumption principally to the middle aged; they do not have to save fully for 
old age consumption, and thus can more easily enjoy more consumption as middle aged.  
In  effect,  bequests  are  equivalent  to  costless  borrowing.
21    As  a  result,  middle  aged 
investors have much higher wealth in the bequest case and bid up securities prices to 
much higher levels as observed. 
 
4.6    Exploring Changes in M and other parameters  
  The data for various M and various γ in an environment of endogenous bequests 
is presented in Tables 8 and 9, respectively.  Broadly speaking, almost all of the 
qualitative relationships detailed for the fixed old age consumption case, and their 
underlying justifications, carry over to this more general setting. 
                                                 
21 We have to be careful of this interpretation in that there is no agency or individual in the model from 
whom the middle aged might borrow.  It is intended to be construed in the sense that a gift is equivalent 
to a loan that never needs repayment.   38 
Table 8 
Effects of Changes in M on Equilibrium Prices, Returns, and Bequests 
 
Endogenous Old Age Consumption 
   = 0.5298,   = 5
(i)
 
  M=0.1  M=0.5  M=1 
(c1(1), c2(1))  41755, 57392  40660,55468  40093,54486 
(c1(2), c2(2))  35716, 28620  34247,27914  34415,27548 
(c1(3), c2(3))  33851, 64219  34247,60735  34271,59143 
(c1(4), c2(4))  30786, 32878  30837,31219  30743,30485 
B(1)  36,212  48,287  54486 
B(2)  18,058  24,300  27548 
B(3)  40,519  52,873  59143 
B(4)  20,745  27,177  30485 
q
e(1)  37,442  46,411  51,014 
q
e(2)  14,384  18,412  20,554 
q
e(3)  9,571  14,636  17,482 
q
e(4)  9,706  13,894  16,153 
 q
rf (1)  0.91  1.01  1.06 
 q
rf (2)  0.90  0.91  0.91 
 q
rf (3)  0.57  0.69  0.75 
 q
rf (4)  0.24  0.31  0.34 
 r
e  5.4%  4.5%  4.1% 
 
 re   11.4%  9.8%  9.2% 
 r
f   2.9%  2.1%  1.8% 
 
 rf   12.5%  10.8%  10.1% 
 r
p  2.5%  2.3%  2.3% 
 
 rp   5.3%  4.3%  3.9% 
Range B/A  0.42-0.47  0.5 – 0.55  0.54 -0.58 
 
 (i) All other parameters as in Table 4.   39 
Table 9 
Effects of Changes in γ on Equilibrium Prices, Returns, and Bequests 
 




  γ=1  γ=3  γ =5 
(c1(1), c2(1))  41154,65411  44737,56865  41755, 57392 
(c1(2), c2(2))  40074,28075  38100,27552  35716, 28620 
(c1(3), c2(3))  21765,84327  33039,67346  33851, 64219 
(c1(4), c2(4))  19741,47911  29022,35687  30786, 32878 
B(1)  6,541  26,394  36,212 
B(2)  2,807  12,789  18,058 
B(3)  8,433  31,259  40,519 
B(4)  4,791  16,564  20,745 
qe(1)  19,823  29,404  37,442 
qe(2)  16,826  18,143  14,384 
qe(3)  9,533  10,762  9,571 
qe(4)  9,432  8,779  9,706 
 q
rf (1)  0.41  0.65  0.91 
 q
rf (2)  0.54  0.82  0.90 
 q
rf (3)  0.27  0.45  0.57 
 q
rf (4)  0.20  0.20  0.24 
 r
e  5.9%  5.5%  5.4% 
 
 re   8.1%  10.8%  11.4% 
 r
f   5.6%  3.9%  2.9% 
 
 rf   8.4%  12.0%  12.5% 
 r
p  0.3%  1.7%  2.5% 
 
 rp   1.1%  4.1%  5.3% 
Range B/A  0.10 – 0.12  0.35 – 0.40  0.42-0.47 
(i) 
 (i) All other parameters as in Table 4. 
  As M increases, in particular, asset prices and the value of bequests rise, while 
expected returns decline.  As in the fixed old age consumption case, return volatilities 
decline over the indicated range. In general, the range of security prices across states is   40 
less in the endogenous consumption case. This is manifest in lower standard deviations 
of return across all securities. Bequests are also smaller since proportionally more 
securities are offered for sale.  However, the volatility of the risk free return exceeds that 
of the equity security, as in Table 3, and for the same fundamental reasons. That 
bequests and old age consumption coincide in real terms for the right most case (Table 
8) is a direct implication of constraint (13), since M = 1 and γC =γB. 
  The comparative results (Tables 5 vs. 9) for an increase in risk aversion are in 
the same spirit.  As in the fixed old age consumption case, greater risk aversion 
coincides with lower expected returns and higher return volatilities.  The equity 
premium also increases with gamma. For     2, E(B/A) uniformly lies nearly within the 
acceptable range. As in the previous case, prices and return statistics are muted relative 
to their fixed old age consumption counterparts.  There are no issues of the non-
existence of equilibrium for any of these cases, however. 
  Substantial differences can be found in the level and variation in the price and 
bequest series.  Comparing Tables 9 with 5, there is seen to be much less variation in 
bequest levels or asset prices across the four states, a fact that is also manifest in the 
means and standard deviations of returns across all the securities.  This is to be 
expected: in the former case quantities can adjust more freely.  There is thus less need 
for prices themselves to adjust.   41 
 
4.7 Changes in the Bequest Parameter x 
Table 10 is the endogenous counterpart to Table 6. Most of the intuition comes over 
from that latter case: an increase in “x” restricts the flexibility of the middle aged and, 
necessarily increases the supply of securities which the middle aged, in equilibrium, must 
purchase. Prices necessarily decline with the resultant increase in expected return. 
Notice also that, for any choice of x, return volatilities are higher under the fixed old 
age consumption regime. This follows from the countervailing force at work in the 
endogenous consumption case which is otherwise absent in the exogenous old age 
consumption setting. Under the former setting, the investor also wishes to stabilize his 
old age consumption, a fact that leads him to seek more strongly to acquire securities in 
low dividend (low price) states than in higher ones. This behavior, per se , tends to 
stabilize prices and is absent in the fixed old age consumption case. Thus price and 
return volatilities are lower. 
  The pattern of volatilities as x increases also varies from Table 6 to Table 10, 
declining with x in the former case and rising in the later. With only a bequest motive 
(Table 6), as the wealth of the middle aged declines (x increases) the price and return 
effects resulting from their desire to stabilize their future wealth are more muted. In the 
exogenous case, this is offset by the middle aged generation’s desire to smooth its old 
age consumption; apparently the former force predominates in Table 10. In either case 
the effects are not large.   42 
Table 10 
Effect on Equilibrium Security Prices and Returns of Changes in x 
  M = 0.1,   = .5298, Y(1), Y(2), W
1(1), W
1(2)as in Table 9  
γC = γB =5 
  
  x = 0  x= 0.10  x= 0.25  x= 0.50 
qe(1)  44,861  41,720  37,442  31,252 
qe(2)  15,699  15,163  14,384  13,130 
qe(3)  13,490  11,822  9,571  6,393 
qe(4)  12,495  11,329  9,706  7,306 
 q
rf (1)  1.02  0.97  0.91  0.80 
 q
rf (2)  0.91  0.90  0.90  0.89 
 q
rf (3)  0.75  0.68  0.57  0.41 
 q
rf (4)  0.29  0.27  0.24  0.19 
 r
e  4.7%  4.9 %  5.4%  6.2% 
 
 re   10.2%  10.6%  11.4%  13.3% 
 r
f   2.1%  2.4%  2.9%  3.7% 
 
 rf   11.5%  11.8%  12.5%  14.1% 
 r
p  2.5%  2.5%  2.5%  2.5% 
 
 rp   5.0%  5.1%  5.3%  5.6% 
Range 
B/A 
0.42-0.46  0.42-0.46  0.42-0.47  0.39-0.39 
   43 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
We have examined the influence of bequests on equilibrium security prices and 
returns.  Generally speaking, the effect of bequests is to dramatically increase security 
prices.  In a standard consumption-savings model, the purchase of securities to finance 
future consumption reduces consumption today, thereby raising the marginal utility of 
consumption, which acts as a discouragement to further savings.  This latter effect is 
not present in a bequest-driven model of the type considered here, at least in the steady 
state, leading to much more powerful income effects.  Both asset prices and price 
volatility tend to be substantially higher.  We are able to keep the prices low and 
generate realistic values of the mean risk free rate, the mean equity premium, the 
variance of the equity premium and the ratio of bequests to wealth by stipulating that a 
portion of the bequests skips a generation. 
Two key parameters of the model are the weight on the utility of bequests and 
the fraction of the bequests that skips the generation of the middle-aged and is received 
by the young.  It is possible that a judicious choice of these parameters may lower the 
observed unrealistically high relative variance of the risk free rate.   44 
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Appendix 1:  
 Existence of Equilibrium 
 
In all cases we set x = 0 for transparency. Our argument is cast as a series of 
propositions. 
 
Proposition 1: Suppose that u (·) = v(·) is of the CRRA family of utility functions with 
common CRRA parameter    and that (Y(j), W
1(j)) follows a level stationary N state 
Markov chain.  Suppose also that   (j)    d(j)+ b  c2 > 0  j  and that  d(j) >1 j .  Let 
    1 be an arbitrarily chosen constant. Define 
 
   
 
  =  (max
1 j N
d(j)) , and  









   
 










A = x(1), . . . , x(N), y(1), . . . , y(N)) : 0   x(i)    , 0  y(i)     { },  




















Proof:  Define the operator    T: A   R+
2N by  
   T(x1,..., xN, y1,..., yN) = 
   
 
 M  1k
W
1(1)+  (1)
x(k)+ by(k)+  (k)
 
   
 










      
 
 M  Nk
W
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  x(k)+ d(k) ( ),  
      
 
 M  1k
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 M  Nk
W
1(N)+  (N)
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22 Note that once the existence of
e q (j)and 
b q (j) j 1,2,3,4, =  is guaranteed, 
f r q (j)follows from (11′) directly.   47 
  The set A is compact in R
2N.  Furthermore, since  (j)>0  j, T is continuous on A. 
Clearly, for every (x(1), . . . , x(N), y(1), . . . , y(N))  ≥  0, T(x(1), . . . , x(N), y(1), . . . 
y(N))  ≥ 0. In order to apply Brower’s Fixed Point Theorem we need only to show that 
each entry in the image of T falls short of  ; i.e., that T(A)   A.  For any x(j) 
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    ML   <    
  For any y(j) 
   
 





   
 




  y(k)+1 ( ) 






   
 
      L<  
 
Thus there exists a fixed point  (ˆ x(1),...,ˆ x(N), ˆ y(1),...,ˆ y(N)) of T on A.  Identify 
       ˆ x(j)   q
e(j) 






b(j) ( ) solves (9￿)  and (10￿) . 
  Note that since 
 
 (j)>0 and d(j)>0  j, q
e(j), q
b(j) ( ) >0  j. Finally,  q
r f (j) > 0 is 
defined as per (11) once  q
e(j), q
b(j) are determined.  
 
Commentary:  The critical assumption in Proposition 1 is that  (j) >0   j.  This means 
that no matter how low asset prices may be, the value of assets cum dividends and 
interest payments is always sufficient to finance old age consumption c2.  Without such 
an assumption, the constant M must be sufficiently large as to guarantee that asset 
prices are great enough to satisfy: 
   q
e(j)+ d(j)+ b(q
b(j)+1)  c2 > 0 
We argue this fact because intuitively as   M   0,    q
e(j)   0 and    q
b(j)    j (see also 
Proposition 2 to follow). Without the   (j) >0  j requirement it is necessary to establish 
a lower bound on M in order for equilibrium to exist, a fact borne out repeatedly by the 
results of our numerical solutions to 
￿ 
(    9 ) (1    1 ). 
 
 




Proposition 2:  Suppose the conditions for the existence of equilibrium are satisfied, and 
assume furthermore that γC = γB > 1.  Suppose also that the endowment process {Y(j), 
W
1(j)} is i.i.d. through time.  If M2 > M1, 
then q
e(j, M2) > q
e(j, M1)   j, q
b(j, M2) > q
b(j, M1)  j and q
rf (j, M2) > q
rf (j, M1)  j. 
 
 
Proof:  For simplicity, let us ignore the consol bond by setting its supply equal to zero. 
 
The system of non-linear equations which define equilibrium is thus, 
 




e(j) =   (j)M   jk
q
e(k)+ d(k)        
q








  j ( ) = W
1(j)+ d(j)  c2 ( )







e(k)+ d(k)        
q
e(k)+ d(k)  c2        
 B .  We first consider a lemma. 
 
Lemma 1:  Let us maintain    B >1.  Since  d(k) > c2,  k, 
 
  Z′(x) < 0, where Z(x) = 
 
x + d(k)
x + d(k)  c2        
 B  . 
 
 




  Z (x) =
x + d(k)  c2        
 B   x + d(k)        
 B x + d(k)  c2        
 B  1
x + d(k)  c2        
2 B  
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The denominator is strictly positive and
 
x + d(k)
x + d(k)  c2
>1  k. 
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and     Z (x)< 0. 
 
Continuation of Proof of Proposition 2:  As noted in the Lemma, we may write the 








  , where Z (x) is differentiable with Z′(x) < 0 for x > 
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> 0   j. 
It follows that if M2 > M1,  
   q
e(j,M2) > q
e(j,M1)   j.    ￿    50 
 
Proposition 3:  Again, consider the case of b = 0, and assume  (j) > 0   j.  Then if  ˆ q
e(j) 
are the equilibrium equity prices for the standard consumption-savings problem and 
 q





e j ( ) > ˆ  q 
e j ( )  j. 
Proof:  We know that equilibrium equity prices exist for both economies; let them be 




e(j) =  M(W
1(j)  ˆ q
e(j))






   
Since 
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e(j) <  M(W
1(j)+ d(j)  c2)
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(ˆ q











1(j)+ d(j)  c2)
  <  M
  jk
(ˆ q




  . 
Thus, for any j, at the prices ˆ q
e(j), the marginal utility cost of acquiring one share of the 
equity security is less than the expected marginal utility benefit in the bequest economy. 
  In order for equilibrium to be established, all prices must be bid up.  Thus 
   q
e(j) > ˆ q
e(j),   j. 
The identical argument can be employed to demonstrate that  
   ˆ q
rf (j) < q
rf (j),   j. 
 
 